The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas\u27s Ethics: Aquinas on the Passions by Stump, Eleonore
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 28 Issue 1 Article 4 
1-1-2011 
The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas's Ethics: Aquinas on 
the Passions 
Eleonore Stump 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Stump, Eleonore (2011) "The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas's Ethics: Aquinas on the Passions," 
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 28 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol28/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 28 No. 1 January 2011 29
All rights reserved
THE NON-ARISTOTELIAN CHARACTER OF 
AQUINAS’S ETHICS: AQUINAS ON THE PASSIONS
Eleonore Stump
Scholars discussing Aquinas’s ethics typically understand it as largely Aristo-
telian, though with some differences accounted for by the differences in world-
view between Aristotle and Aquinas. In this paper, I argue against this view. I 
show that although Aquinas recognizes the Aristotelian virtues, he thinks they 
are not real virtues. Instead, for Aquinas, the passions—or the suitably formu-
lated intellectual and volitional analogues to the passions—are not only the 
foundation of any real ethical life but also the flowering of what is best in it.
Introduction
It has become a commonplace to see Aquinas as Aristotelian in his philos-
ophy.1 This is particularly the case as regards his ethics. Scholars discuss-
ing Aquinas’s ethics typically understand it as largely Aristotelian, though 
with some differences accounted for by the differences in worldview be-
tween Aristotle and Aquinas. T. I. Irwin, for example, summarizes his dis-
cussion of moral virtue in Aquinas’s thought this way:
[Aquinas’s] account of moral virtue emphasizes the aspect of Aristotle’s ac-
count that connects virtue with correct election. Aquinas has not only Aris-
totle’s reasons, but also some reasons of his own, for emphasizing this fea-
ture of the virtues. . . . Aquinas’ claims about action and freedom agree with 
Aristotle’s claim that correct election is the mark of moral virtue.2
Ralph McInerny highlights what he sees as the Aristotelianism of Aqui-
nas’s ethics in the Summa theologiae this way:
The dominant voice in these questions is that of Aristotle. . . . It is fair to say that 
these discussions would have been unthinkable apart from the influence of Ar-
istotle, particularly, though by no means exclusively, of his Nicomachean Ethics.3
1For a review of the disputes over the connection between Aristotle and Aquinas in the 
history of Thomism, see, for example, Mark Jordan, “The Alleged Aristotelianism of Thomas 
Aquinas,” in The Gilson Lectures on Thomas Aquinas, ed. James Reilly (Toronto: Pontifical In-
stitute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008), 73–106.
2See, for example, T. I. Irwin’s treatment of virtue in Aquinas’s thought in Irwin’s The 
Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
vol. 1, 544 [footnotes omitted in quotation].
3Ralph McInerny, The Question of Christian Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University 
of America Press, 1993), 25–26.
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Anthony Kenny explains Aquinas’s attempt to weave the beatitudes 
into his discussion of what Kenny takes to be fundamentally an Aristote-
lian ethics by saying,
The endeavor to bring together the evangelical and the Nicomachean texts 
can hardly be regarded as successful. . . . What is remarkable about this 
rapprochement is not that it is done successfully but that it is done at all. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the Christian texts are distorted to fit the 
Aristotelian context, rather than the other way around.4
Taking Aquinas’s ethics as fundamentally Aristotelian has become al-
most scholarly dogma by now, and there is some reason for it. Aquinas’s 
ethics is a virtue ethics, centered around a list of the virtues that includes 
some which, at least on the surface, appear to be identical to those on Ar-
istotle’s list: wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance.
On the Aristotelian ethics that many scholars suppose Aquinas accepts, 
a moral virtue is a habit which is acquired through practice and which dis-
poses the will to act in accordance with reason in varying circumstances. 
Given this strong connection between virtue and reason, the passions are 
at best an ancillary to moral virtue and at worst an obstacle to it. As Irwin 
interprets what he takes to be Aquinas’s Aristotelian view of the passions,
Passions are constituents of a virtue in so far as they are subject to reason 
and moved by reason.5
Adopting a similar view, Peter King says,
Aquinas holds contra Hume, that reason is and ought to be the ruler of the 
passions; since the passions can be controlled by reason they should be con-
trolled by reason.6
For those who equate passion with emotion,7 it can seem as if such an Ar-
istotelianism in ethics mandates an alienation from emotion and grounds 
human moral excellence in reason alone. Because they understand Aris-
totelianism in this way, some people are repelled by what strikes them 
as inhuman in such an ethics; but there are certainly others who have an 
opposite reaction. For some contemporary thinkers, the Aristotelian focus 
on reason and the apparently concomitant rejection of a significant role 
4Anthony Kenny, “Aquinas on Aristotelian Happiness,” Aquinas’s Moral Theory, ed. Scott 
MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 15–27.
5Irwin, Development of Ethics, 522.
6Peter King, “Aquinas on the Passions,” in Aquinas’s Moral Theory, ed. Scott MacDonald 
and Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 126.
7There is some reason for rejecting this equation if ‘passion’ is taken in its most basic 
sense. In contemporary discussion of the emotions, an emotion is typically held to have cog-
nitive content. For Aquinas, as I explain below, a passion taken in its strictest sense is an act 
of the sensitive appetite when that appetite is responding to deliverances from the senses 
alone. In order to have the cognitive content of the sort typically thought to be at issue in an 
emotion, what is needed is some deliverance from the intellect, rather than the senses. On the 
other hand, a passion in its extended or analogous senses, explained below, can have cogni-
tive content; and so, depending on the account of emotion given, a passion in this extended 
sense might well be the same as an emotion. 
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for emotion is necessary for any ethics able to guide human life. So, for 
example, in a recent New York Times article on Catholic ethical and politi-
cal stances,8 the influential Princeton scholar Robert George is quoted as 
praising an Aristotelian ethics of this sort, which he attributes to Aquinas. 
For George, “moral philosophy . . . is a contest between . . . Aristotle and 
. . . David Hume.”9 On George’s view, an ethics such as that of Hume, 
which centers ethics in the passions, can never give us an objective ethics. 
George thinks that we should reject the passion-centered ethics of Hume 
in favor of a reason-centered Aristotelian approach of the sort he thinks he 
finds in Aquinas. For George, the Aristotelian ethics of Aquinas is prefera-
ble to that of Hume because, on George’s view, Aquinas’s Aristotelian eth-
ics grounds all virtue, all moral excellence, in reason. “In a well-ordered 
soul,” George says, “reason’s got the whip hand over emotion.”10
Whatever the truth of this view may be as regards Aristotle’s own eth-
ics, it is certainly false, in its central claims, as regards the ethics of Aqui-
nas; and some opposition to it has already begun to find a voice in the 
scholarly literature. So, for example, Jean Porter says
[There is] a . . . tendency among Aquinas scholars, . . . misleading and . . . 
prevalent, . . . to read Aquinas as if he not only baptized Aristotle, but is 
himself little more than Aristotle baptized.11
But I would make the point more strongly. Aquinas recognizes the Aris-
totelian virtues, but he thinks that they are not real virtues. In fact, Aquinas 
goes so far as to maintain that the passions—or the suitably formulated in-
tellectual and volitional analogues to the passions—are not only the foun-
dation of any real ethical life but also the flowering of what is best in it.12
Aquinas’s Ethics Is not Aristotelian
To understand what Aquinas’s position on the passions and their role in 
the ethical life actually is, it helps to begin by setting aside the view that 
Aquinas holds an Aristotelian virtue ethics.
As Aquinas rightly sees it, each of the dispositions on Aristotle’s list—
wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance—is meant to be both a vir-
tue and an acquired characteristic. That is, a person gets an Aristotelian 
8The New York Times Magazine, Dec. 20, 2009, 24–29.
9Ibid., 27.
10Ibid.
11Jean Porter, “Right Reason and the Love of God: The Prameters of Aquinas’ Moral The-
ology,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow 
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 167–191. See also her essay “Virtues 
and Vices,” in The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
12For a thorough and persuasive argument that Aquinas’s ethics is not Aristotelian but in fact 
takes the second-personal as foundational for ethics, see Andrew Pinsent, “Gifts and Fruits,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011). See also his Joint Attention and the Second-Personal Foundation of Aquinas’s Virtue 
Ethics, PhD Dissertation, St. Louis University, June 2009; and his review of Robert Miner’s 
Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (February 2010).
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virtue or moral excellence by practicing it, by doing acts of the sort that 
yield the disposition of the virtue when those acts have been done often 
enough. Furthermore, each Aristotelian virtue is an intrinsic characteris-
tic, a property that can be gotten and preserved by an individual acting 
by himself as an agent in his own right. The problem with thinking of 
Aquinas’s ethics as Aristotelian is that none of these things true of the 
items on Aristotle’s list of the virtues is true of the things Aquinas takes 
to be real virtues.
Speaking of Aquinas’s virtue theory, Robert Pasnau and Christopher 
Shields define virtue for Aquinas this way:
A virtue is a habitus [a disposition] that informs a reason-governed power in 
such a way as to perfect the activity of that power.13
This is perhaps an acceptable definition of an Aristotelian virtue, but it is 
not Aquinas’s definition of what he takes to be a virtue.
Aquinas himself affirms Augustine’s definition of a virtue:
A virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one lives righteously, of 
which no one can make bad use, and which God works in us without us.14
This is manifestly an un-Aristotelian definition, not least because it is im-
possible to acquire for oneself by practice a disposition that God works in 
a person without that person15 (though, Aquinas thinks, without in any 
way precluding the freedom of that person’s will).16 Commenting on this 
definition, Aquinas says,
This definition comprises perfectly the whole formula of virtue.17
Aquinas recognizes that the Aristotelian virtues, acquired through 
practice of the acts correlated with a virtue, do not fit this definition be-
cause of its last clause: “which God works in us without us.” He says,
acquired virtue, to which these words do not apply, is not of the same spe-
cies as infused virtue.18
13Robert Pasnau and Christopher Shields, The Philosophy of Aquinas (Boulder, CO: West-
view Press, 2004), 229.
14ST I-II q.55 a.4. In this paper, with a very few alterations, I am using the translation of 
the Fathers of the Dominican English Province, (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981), 
because it has become standard and because there are few cases in which I think I could 
improve on it substantially. There are some quotations where I have altered the Dominican 
translation in minor ways (as in the quotation to which this footnote is appended) or even 
significantly; but I have left those alterations generally unmarked, thereby erring on the side 
of giving more credit than is due to the Dominican translation.
15For detailed discussion of the way in which, on Aquinas’s views, God does so, see Chap-
ter 13, on grace and free will, in my Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003).
16For a discussion of the way in which such a claim can be made consistently, see Chapter 
13 in my Aquinas.
17ST I-II q. 55 a.4. 
18ST I-II q.63 a.4 s.c.; cf. also, for example, Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus in communi 
q.un. aa.9–10 and ST I-II q.55 a.4.
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And so acquired virtues are not habits that contain, as he says, the whole 
formula of virtue, as the infused virtues do.
Whatever benefits the Aristotelian virtues, with their source in human 
reason, might have for their possessor, on Aquinas’s views, a person who 
has only the Aristotelian virtues is not yet in accord with the true moral 
good, whose measure is the divine law. He says,
human virtue directed to the good which is governed according to the rule 
of human reason can be caused by human acts. . . . But virtue which directs a 
person to good as governed by the divine law, and not by human reason, can-
not be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but is produced 
in us by the divine operation alone. That is why Augustine in giving the defi-
nition of such virtue inserts the words ‘which God works in us without us’.19
In discussing the thesis of the unity of the virtues, Aquinas maintains 
that the thesis does not hold of the Aristotelian virtues but does hold of the 
infused virtues. Explaining this distinction, he says,
Moral virtue may be considered either in its perfect or in its imperfect state. 
An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance or fortitude, is nothing 
but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such incli-
nation be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in 
this way, they are not connected. . . . But perfect moral virtue is a habit that 
inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, 
we must say that they are connected.20
And a little later in the same question he says,
if a person exercises himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not 
in regard to another, for instance by behaving well in matters of anger but 
not in matters of concupiscence, he will indeed acquire a certain habit of 
restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the formula of virtue.21
Finally, Aquinas is emphatic that there can be no moral virtue at all 
without the infused virtue of love. He says,
It is written: “He who does not love abides in death” (1 John 3:14). Now 
the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is by them that we live 
rightly, as Augustine states (De libero arbitrio ii). Therefore, the virtues cannot 
be without love.22
He considers the following objection to this view of his:
moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts . . . whereas love can-
not be had otherwise than by infusion. . . . Therefore it is possible to have the 
other virtues without love.23
In response to this objection, he says nothing more than this:
19ST I-II q.63 a.2. 
20ST I-II q. 65 a.1.
21ST I-II q.65 a.1 ad 1.
22ST I-II q.65 a.2 s.c.
23ST I-II q.65 a.2 obj.2.
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This argument holds good of moral virtue in the sense of acquired virtue.24
From his point of view, then, the claim that the acquired virtues can be had 
without the infused virtue of love is no objection to his claim that NO vir-
tues can be had without the infused virtue of love. And this conclusion can 
be true only if, in his view, the acquired virtues are not real virtues at all.
In fact, on Aquinas’s account, it is possible to have all of the acquired 
virtues and still not be a moral person. A person in mortal sin is a person 
whose moral condition is bad enough that his soul is in peril; but, for 
Aquinas, a person could have all the acquired virtues and still have mortal 
sin. That is why he says,
Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue. . . . But an act of sin, 
even mortal sin, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue.25
(This conclusion is, of course, what one might have expected given Aqui-
nas’s position on the unity of the virtues thesis.)
In another question, Aquinas asks whether it is possible to have the 
infused virtue of love without also having the moral virtues; and, in re-
sponse, he says (again, as one would expect from his position on the unity 
of the virtues thesis),
All the moral virtues are infused simultaneously together with love.26
If this is true, Aquinas goes on to ask, why, then, do some people who 
have the infused virtue of love still have difficulty with some acts of moral 
virtue, contrary to Aristotle’s claim that a person with a virtue does easily 
the acts correlated with that virtue? In reply, Aquinas explains that what is 
at issue for Aristotle is only the acquired virtues; but these are not the real 
virtues. For this reason, it is true that the acquired virtues are not part of 
what is infused when all the moral virtues are infused together with love. 
And Aristotle’s claim about the acts associated with a virtue is not true 
with regard to the real (that is, the infused) moral virtues; it is true only of 
the acquired virtues.27
There are many other places one might cite, but these are sufficient, it 
seems to me, to show that Aquinas’s account of the virtues is not Aristote-
lian. Although Aquinas certainly recognizes a role for reason in the ethical 
life, the virtues around which his ethics is based are the virtues infused 
by God.
Aquinas’s Three-layered Theory of Moral Dispositions
To understand Aquinas’s own theory of ethics, it is important to see that he 
recognizes three kinds of things that can be considered moral dispositions: 
the Aristotelian or acquired virtues, the infused virtues, and the gifts of the 
24ST I-II q.65 a.2 ad 2.
25See, for example, ST I-II q.63 a.2 ad 2.
26ST I-II q.65 a.3. 
27ST I-II q.65 a.3 ad 2.
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Holy Spirit.28 The list of the things that are dispositions acquired by practice 
includes Aristotle’s main four: wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance. 
The list of the infused virtues includes some that have the same names as the 
acquired virtues and some that do not, most notably the theological virtues of 
faith, hope, and love. Although there is some apparent overlap between these 
two lists and the list of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the gifts are radically dif-
ferent from both the acquired and the infused virtues, because, in Aquinas’s 
view, the gifts are a product of an on-going relationship between a human 
person and the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, which somehow 
is within that human person. There are seven gifts of the Holy Spirit: pietas, 
courage, fear of the Lord, wisdom, understanding, counsel, and knowledge.
As I have been at pains to illustrate above, for Aquinas, the infused 
virtues are the real virtues and are necessary for the moral life. Nonethe-
less, on Aquinas’s account, the heart of the moral life lies in the gifts of the 
Holy Spirit. It is not possible, on his view, to have one’s rational faculties 
of intellect and will be in a good state without the indwelling Holy Spirit; 
and when a person does have the indwelling Holy Spirit, that person also 
has the gifts that the Holy Spirit brings with it. Without the gifts of the 
Holy Spirit, Aquinas thinks, it is not possible to be a moral person or to be 
in union with a perfectly good God.29
Aquinas gives a relatively clear explanation of the function of the gifts. 
They are something like enzymes for the theological virtues, and especially 
the theological virtue of love, which is the sine qua non of the whole ethical 
life. An enzyme can bind with one active ingredient of a biochemical reaction 
and, altered in form and function by that binding, it can interact with another 
substrate to catalyze a reaction which would go very imperfectly without the 
enzyme. In the same way, for Aquinas, the gifts of the Holy Spirit have the 
effect of anchoring the infused theological virtues more deeply in a person’s 
psyche and enabling them to have their desired effect there. The gifts of the 
Holy Spirit as-it-were cement the infused virtues into the psyche.30
Nonetheless, even with so much clarification of their function, it is not 
immediately apparent what the gifts of the Holy Spirit are, on Aquinas’s 
account. In this connection, it is worth noticing that, although each of the 
four main Aristotelian or acquired virtues has analogues among the in-
fused virtues, each also has a correlate among the gifts of the Holy Spirit. 
The list of the gifts includes courage and wisdom, each of which is on the 
Aristotelian list; and the other two on that list, justice and temperance, also 
have correlates among the gifts, although under different names. Turned 
into gifts, as Aquinas himself makes clear, temperance becomes fear of the 
Lord, and justice becomes pietas.31
28There is another story to be told about the way in which the gifts of the Holy Spirit are 
mediated by the sacraments, but this subject is outside the bounds of this paper. 
29See, for example, ST I-II q. 68 a.2.
30See, for example, ST I-II q.68 a.2 ad 2.
31See, for example, ST II-II q. 19 and q.121 a.1.
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To begin to see what the gifts of the Holy Spirit are and something of 
the way in which Aquinas’s ethical theory is meant to work, take, for ex-
ample, courage. On Aquinas’s theory, courage can be considered as an Ar-
istotelian virtue, as an infused virtue, or as a gift of the Holy Spirit. Cour-
age as an Aristotelian virtue is a disposition which an agent acquires for 
himself and which facilitates reason’s governing that agent in such a way 
as to make him a good citizen of an earthly community.32 Considered in 
this way, courage can fail to be a moral disposition; and it can be had even 
by those who are not moral people. Courage considered as an infused 
virtue is a disposition which is infused into a person by God and which 
makes that person suitable for the community of heaven.33 Considered in 
this way, courage is a real virtue, but it is not courage in its full form. For 
courage in its full form, one needs courage as a gift of the Holy Spirit. Con-
sidered as a gift, however, courage is very different even from courage as 
an infused virtue. Taken as a gift, courage manifests itself in a disposition 
to act on the settled conviction that one is united to God now and will be 
united to God in heaven when one dies.34
Considered as a gift, courage, like the rest of the gifts, stems from rela-
tionship with God, whose indwelling Holy Spirit manifests itself first in 
a human person’s enhanced openness to God in love. By filling a person 
with joy in love with God, Aquinas says, the Holy Spirit protects people 
against two kinds of evils, which might otherwise make them give way 
to fear:
[it protects them] first against the evil which disturbs peace, since peace is 
disturbed by adversities. But with regard to adversities the Holy Spirit per-
fects [us] through patience, which enables [us] to bear adversities patient-
ly. . . . Second, [it protects them] against the evil which arrests joy, namely, 
the wait for what is loved. To this evil, the Spirit opposes long-suffering, 
which is not broken by the waiting.35
The gift of courage in the face of adversity is thus one result stemming 
from the indwelling Holy Spirit.
The Second-personal in Aquinas’s Ethics
With this much clarification, we are in a better position to understand the 
nature of the gifts.
32See, for example, ST I-II q.63 a.4.
33For the general discussion, see Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus in communi q. un. a.9 
and Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus cardinalibus, q. un. a.2. Cf. also ST II-II q. 124 a.2 ad 1, 
and q.123 a.5, 6, and 7 and q.140 a.1.
34See, for example, ST II-II q. 139 a.1.
35Aquinas, In Gal 5.6. There is an English translation of this work: Commentary on Saint 
Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians by St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. F. R. Larcher and Richard Murphy 
(Albany: Magi Books, 1966). Although I have preferred to use my own translations, I found 
the Larcher and Murphy translation helpful, and the citations for this work are given both 
to the Latin and to the Larcher and Murphy translation. For this passage, see Larcher and 
Murphy, 180. Cf. also, In Gal 5.6 (Larcher and Murphy, 179) and In Heb 12.2.
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For Aquinas, salvation from sin and the moral excellence that is part of 
it require the gifts of the Holy Spirit. So, for example, he says,
Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now 
each of these is necessary for salvation. . . . Therefore the other gifts that are 
placed between these are also necessary for salvation.36
But the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not states that are wholly intrinsic to 
a person, and they cannot be described adequately in either first-personal 
or third-personal terms. Rather, as the very name suggests, the gifts of the 
Holy Spirit are second-personal in character.
Recently, attention has been focused on the second-personal because 
of the outpouring of research on autistic spectrum disorder in children, 
which has an impairment in the capacities for second-personal connec-
tion at its root. This research has made philosophers as well as psycholo-
gists and neuroscientists more reflective about the fact that human beings 
are social animals and that they are designed for what philosophers now 
call ‘mind-reading’ or ‘social cognition.’ We can think of mind-reading 
or social cognition as a non-propositional knowledge of persons gained 
through second-personal experience.37 Such knowledge is an achievement 
of the operation of a set of cognitive capacities that share many features 
with perception: they are direct, immediate, intuitive in character, and 
basically reliable. The deliverances of these cognitive capacities give one 
person, Jerome, an understanding of the mind of another person, Paula. 
In particular, these cognitive capacities enable Jerome to know in a direct 
and intuitive way what Paula is doing, to what end Paula is doing it, and 
with what emotion or affect she is doing it.38
For Aquinas, it is open to every human person to have a second-person-
al connection with God; and, because of this connection, it is possible for 
there to be as-it-were mind-reading or social cognition between a human 
person and God too. A human person can know God’s presence and some-
thing of God’s mind in a direct and intuitive way that is in some respects 
like the mind-reading between human persons.39 On Aquinas’s views,
There is one general way by which God is in all things by essence, power, 
and presence, [namely,] as a cause in the effects participating in his good-
ness. But in addition to this way there is a special way [in which God is in a 
thing by essence, power, and presence] which is appropriate for a rational 
creature, in whom God is said to be as the thing known is in the knower and 
36ST I-II q.68 a.2 s.c.
37For a discussion of the knowledge of persons, see Chapter 4 in my Wandering in Dark-
ness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
38For a summary of some of the literature on this subject and its significance for under-
standing second-personal interaction, see Chapter 4 of my Wandering in Darkness: Narrative 
and the Problem of Suffering, op. cit. 
39For a detailed argument for this claim, see my “Eternity, Simplicity, and Presence,” in The 
Science of Being as Being: Metaphysical Investigations, ed. Gregory T. Doolan (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2011). See also my “Simplicity,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Aquinas, ed. Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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the beloved is in the lover. . . . In this special way, God is not only said to be 
in a rational creature but even to dwell in that creature.40
On Aquinas’s view, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are an outgrowth and a 
manifestation of a second-personal connection to God. Every gift of the 
Holy Spirit has its source in God’s indwelling in a human person; and, in 
addition to its other functions, it results in a person’s being attentive to 
God and apt to follow the inner promptings of God. Speaking of the gifts, 
Aquinas says,
These perfections are called ‘gifts’, not only because they are infused by 
God, but also because by them a person is disposed to become amenable to 
the divine inspiration.41
And a little later he says,
the gifts are perfections of a human being, whereby he is disposed so as to 
be amenable to the promptings of God.42
In fact, for Aquinas, the Holy Spirit fills a person with a sense of the 
love of God and his nearness, so that joy is one of the principal effects of 
the Holy Spirit.43 Aquinas says,
the ultimate perfection, by which a person is made perfect inwardly, is joy, 
which stems from the presence of what is loved. Whoever has the love of 
God, however, already has what he loves, as is said in 1 John 4:16: “whoever 
abides in the love of God abides in God, and God abides in him.” And joy 
wells up from this.44
When [Paul] says “the Lord is near,” he points out the cause of joy, because 
a person rejoices at the nearness of his friend.45
On Aquinas’s view, a second-personal connection of love between two 
human persons enables them to grow in what Aquinas calls connaturality 
with each other. So, for example, if Paula and Jerome love each other and 
are united to each other, then Paula and Jerome will tend to become more 
like each other.46 Their judgments and intuitions about things will become 
similar too. For Aquinas, a second-personal connection between a person 
Paula and God will have the same sort of effect. It is possible also to have 
connaturality with God.
If Paula has a second-personal connection with God, then Paula will 
grow in connaturality with God. Connected to God in this way, Paula’s 
40ST I q.43 a.3.
41ST I-II q.68 a.1.
42ST I-II q.68 a.2.
43See, for example, In Rom 5.1.
44In Gal 5.6; Larcher and Murphy, 179–180.
45In Phil 4.1. For an English translation, see Commentary on Saint Paul’s First Letter to the 
Thessalonians and the Letter to the Philippians by St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. F. R. Larcher and 
Michael Duffy (Albany: Magi Books, 1969), 113.
46See, in this connection, ST I-II q.27 a. 3 and q.28 a.1.
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intuitions and judgments will naturally grow to be more like those of God; 
and her second-personal connection to God will enable her to interact in 
some mind-reading sort of way with God, too. On Aquinas’s view, be-
cause of his commitment to the unity of the virtues thesis, which encom-
passes also the gifts of the Holy Spirit, this is the optimal ethical condition 
for a human person. In this condition, Paula will not need to try to reason 
things out as regards ethics. She will be disposed to think and act in mor-
ally appropriate ways because of her connection to God, not because of 
her reliance on reason. And her second-personal interaction with God will 
allow her judgments to be informed by God’s judgments and God’s will.
So, for example, in explaining wisdom as one of the gifts of the Holy 
Spirit (rather than as an infused or an acquired virtue),47 Aquinas connects 
wisdom as a gift with the will. He says,
wisdom denotes a certain rectitude of judgment according to the eternal 
law. Now rectitude of judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use 
of reason, secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter 
about which one has to judge. . . . Now sympathy or connaturality for divine 
things is the result of love, which unites us to God. . . . Consequently wis-
dom which is a gift has its cause in the will, and this cause is love.48
The idea that the heart of ethics is second-personal has most recently 
been called to the attention of philosophers by Stephen Darwall,49 though 
in the past it has often been associated with Levinas. But, as these brief 
remarks show, an emphasis on the second-personal is central to Aquinas’s 
ethics, too. For Aquinas, however, unlike Levinas or Darwall, God is one of 
the relata; to be a moral person is a matter of having a right second-personal 
relationship to God. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are ethical excellences that 
are second-personal in character too. They stem from the Holy Spirit’s in-
dwelling in a human person Jerome, having a second-personal connection 
with Jerome, and thereby enabling Jerome to have a mind-reading connec-
tion with God. For Aquinas, true second-personal moral excellences arise 
when the second-personal connection between God and a human person 
has produced in that human person a kind of connaturality with God.
Passion: Sense Appetite and Intellect
With this much understanding of the three-layered character of Aquinas’s 
theory of ethics, we are in a position to understand better the role of the 
passions in Aquinas’s ethics. That is because there is also a certain three-
layered character to Aquinas’s account of the passions. As will be readily 
apparent, here, too, there is overlap among his lists.
47The question of ST at issue is on wisdom as a gift. The first article asks whether wisdom 
should be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and Aquinas, of course, answers in 
the affirmative.
48ST II-II q.45 a.2.
49Stephen Darwall, The Second-person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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For Aquinas, the fundamental passion, that is, the passion that under-
lies the others, is love; and the principal passions, that is, the passions 
that are the source of the others, are joy and sadness, hope and fear.50 But 
Aquinas actually has three different lists of the passions or analogues to 
the passions. Love and joy are on all three lists; and sadness, hope, and 
fear are represented on two.51
It is helpful to begin with the lowest level of Aquinas’s three-layered 
lore of the passions, namely, with ‘passion’ taken in its most basic sense.52 
Here it is helpful to review very briefly Aquinas’s theory of the mecha-
nisms of human cognition and the relation of the passions to the cognitive 
capacities involved.53
Aquinas is part of the Aristotelian tradition that supposes there to be 
two different appetites in human beings, the sensory and the intellective. 
Each of these is a power whose outputs are desires. The sensory appetite 
produces desires on the basis of information coming into the mind from 
the senses—the smell of baking bread, the sight of fresh blood. A person 
can be absorbed in a book while he is smelling bread baking, without tak-
ing any notice of what he is smelling. If he feels hungry in that condition, 
before he recognizes that what he is smelling is bread baking, then his 
hungriness, his desire for bread, is a motion only of the sensory appetite 
and constitutes a passion. A desire for bread which is produced just by the 
smell of bread baking is a passion in the most basic sense of ‘passion.’
So understood in its most basic sense as a motion of the sensory appe-
tite, a passion is a response on the part of the sensory appetite to the direct 
and intuitive input from the senses. Nonetheless, even such a lowest-level 
passion is able to influence the intellect. It can make things seem good that 
would not have seemed good to the intellect without the influence of that 
passion. When it acts in this way, a passion is detrimental to the moral life. 
On the other hand, such a passion can also work together with the intellect 
subsequent to a deliverance of the intellect. In those circumstances, the 
passion can stimulate a person to pursue what is really good with more 
fervor. In cases of this kind, a passion enhances the moral life.
So if a passion is taken in this lowest level sense, it is in its own nature 
neither good nor bad. Its moral character is derivative from its connection 
50See, for example, ST I-II q.25 a.4.
51There are intellective analogues for the basic passions of sadness, fear, and hope; and 
hope, of course, is also on the list of the infused virtues. Depending on how one understands 
fear as a gift of the Holy Spirit, it may be that fear should also be reckoned as on three lists, 
one of which is the gifts. In this paper, I have separated the three-layered account of ethics—
acquired virtues, infused virtues, and gifts of the Holy Spirit—from the three-layered lore 
of the passions—passions in the most basic sense, passions in their intellective analogues, 
and fruits of the Holy Spirit. As these brief remarks about fear show, however, there are also 
connections between these two sets of three lists. Nonetheless, in the interest of brevity, I am 
leaving these connections to one side here.
52For the basic Thomistic lore of the passions, see Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the 
Passions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
53For the basic Thomistic lore on the mechanisms of cognition, see Chapter 8 in my Aqui-
nas (London: Routledge, 2003).
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to reason, in a way characteristic of Aristotelian ethics, as Aristotelian eth-
ics is commonly understood.
But, for Aquinas, passion can also be understood in an extended sense. 
In this sense, a passion is not in the sensory appetite but rather in the intel-
lective appetite. The intellective appetite produces desires on the basis of 
all the information coming into the mind. This appetite is what Aquinas 
understands as the will; and it is responsive to all the deliverances of the 
intellect (including those deliverances based on the intellect’s connection 
to the senses), rather than to the deliverances of the senses alone. When a 
person recognizes that what he is smelling is bread and when in those cir-
cumstances, all things considered, he wants to get and eat what he recog-
nizes as bread, the desire in question is in the intellective appetite or will, 
not in the sensory appetite (or at least not in the sensory appetite alone).
A passion in the basic sense is a desire aimed at the good as the good 
is perceived by the senses. When the good is perceived by the intellect 
and stimulates the intellective appetite or will, the resulting desire has 
something in common with a passion in its most basic sense, even though 
it lacks the tie to the senses. In the intellective appetite, the desire is not so 
much a bodily feeling prompted by a perception as it is a conative attitude 
prompted by the mind’s understanding.54 So, for example, although in its 
most basic sense love is a passion in the sensitive appetite, there is a dif-
ferent sense of love in which love stems from deliverances of the intellect 
and is an expression of the intellective appetite.
As an expression of the intellective appetite and its interaction with the 
intellect, love is also a passion or, more strictly, an analogue to the pas-
sions. So understood, love—and also the other passions such as joy, hope, 
and the rest—are, on Aquinas’s view, the formal part of passion with-
out the material part, that is, without the part which is tied to the body, 
namely, the senses and the sensitive appetite.55 Passions in this analogous 
or extended sense are the second layer in Aquinas’s three-layered lore of 
the passions. Considered in this extended sense, some of the things on 
Aquinas’s list of the passions can be had even by an impassible God. God 
has no passions in the basic sense of ‘passion’ in virtue of having no body 
and thus no senses. But, on Aquinas’s view, God does have love and joy, 
for example.56
It is important to see in this connection that two of the infused virtues 
have the same names as two of the primary passions: love and hope. Taken 
as the formal part of passion without the material part, then, love, which is 
the foundational passion in the sensory appetite, and hope, which is one 
of the principal passions, can also be dispositions in the intellective ap-
petite infused into a person by God. As infused virtues in the intellective 
appetite, love and hope are not morally neutral. They are always good. In 
54See, for example, ST I-II q. 26 a.1.
55See, for example, ST I q.20 a.1 ad 2.
56See, for example, ST I. q.20 a.1.
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fact, as I explained above, on Aquinas’s account, love as an infused virtue 
is essential to all the real moral virtues; and, without love, no real moral 
virtue at all is possible. Furthermore, since Aquinas accepts the unity of the 
virtues thesis—not for the acquired virtues but for the infused virtues—all 
moral excellence, all virtue, is present at once as soon as love is infused.57
But this is not yet the end of the story. There is still the third layer to 
Aquinas’s lore of the passions. Just as the virtues have analogues in the 
gifts of the Holy Spirit, so the passions also have analogues in the fruits of 
the Holy Spirit. There are twelve fruits of the Holy Spirit: love, joy, peace, 
patience, long-suffering, goodness, benignity, meekness, fidelity, modesty, 
continence, and chastity. The first two items on this list, love and joy, are, 
of course, also on the list of the primary passions and their intellective 
correlates. As Aquinas explains the first five fruits of the Holy Spirit, they 
are in fact all consequences of shared love between a human person and 
God. The remaining seven have to do, one way or another, with the love 
of one’s neighbor understood as beloved of God or with suitable love of 
oneself and one’s body.58
Like the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and unlike the passions in their most 
basic sense, all the fruits of the Holy Spirit are second-personal in charac-
ter. Aquinas explains them as the emotional condition of someone who is 
connected in love with God. He says this about the first three fruits of the 
Holy Spirit—love, joy, and peace:
[God] himself is love. Hence it is written (Rom.5.5): “The love of God is 
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us.” The neces-
sary result of this love is joy, because every lover rejoices at being united to 
the beloved. Now love has always the actual presence of God whom it loves. 
So the consequence of this love is joy. And the perfection of joy is peace . . . 
because our desires rest altogether in [God].59
For Aquinas, then, the contribution of the fruits of the Holy Spirit to the 
moral life is not a matter of the passions being governed by reason, any 
more than it is in the case of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Rather, the fruits of 
the Holy Spirit are a matter of having emotions, spiritual analogues to the 
passions, transformed in second-personal connection to God.
This is a far cry from Robert George’s view of Aquinas as basing the 
moral life in reason’s having the whip hand over emotion.
Conclusion
So here is where things stand. It may be true that for Aristotle the moral 
life is a matter of living in accordance with reason and disciplining the 
passions so that at best they help an agent live in accordance with reason. 
But things are very different when it comes to Aquinas’s theory of the 
ethical life. For Aquinas, there are passions, in an analogous or extended 
57See ST I-II q. 65.
58See, for example, ST I-II q.70 a.3.
59ST I-II q. 70 a.3.
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sense, which are infused by God into the intellective appetite or which are 
the fruits of the Holy Spirit and stem from second-personal connection to 
God. These passions or analogues to the passions are foundational to all 
virtue and to the whole of the ethical life. On Aquinas’s view, no moral 
virtue is possible without all the gifts and fruits of the Holy Spirit, and any 
moral virtue requires all of them.
What makes Aquinas’s focus on the passions in his three-layered ac-
count different from Hume’s focus on the passions in his ethical theory 
has entirely to do with relationship, with the second-personal. Hume rec-
ognizes that human beings are capable of a kind of mind-reading of one 
another. He says,
The minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect 
each others’ emotions, but also because those rays of passion, sentiments, 
and opinions may often be reverberated.60
And that is why Hume says of himself,
A cheerful countenance infuses a sensible complacency and serenity in my 
mind, as an angry or sullen one throws a sudden damp upon me.61
Nonetheless, for Hume, a passion is just an intrinsic characteristic of 
an agent, which the agent has in himself alone as the individual he is. 
By contrast, from Aquinas’s point of view, the gifts and the fruits of the 
Holy Spirit are not intrinsic characteristics but relational ones. The gifts 
stem from second-personal connection to God, from second-personal in-
teraction in as-it-were mind-reading with God; and the fruits are the emo-
tions that result from this second personal connection. What differentiates 
Aquinas from Hume, then, is not that Aquinas privileges reason while 
Hume privileges passion in the ethical life. Rather, it is that the emotions 
Aquinas highlights as essential to the ethical life have to do with relation-
ship to God. Understood as the infused virtues of hope and love, or as the 
fruits of the Holy Spirit, the flowering of second-personal connection with 
a personal God, passion in its analogous sense is for Aquinas the touch-
stone of all morality.
St. Louis University
60Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book 2, Pt. 2, section 5. I am indebted to Annette Baier 
for this reference. As she herself makes clear, Hume’s philosophy emphasizes the impor-
tance of what he calls ‘sympathy’ for all of ethics.
61Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Book 2, Pt. 1, section 11. I am grateful to Annette Baier 
for this reference, and I am grateful to anonymous referees for Faith and Philosophy for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
